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ABSTRACT
For over 3 decades, those engaged in the battle over the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA),
along with many scholarly commentators, have argued that ratification of the amendment
will lead U.S. courts (1) to elevate the standard of law they now use to adjudicate claims of
sex discrimination, which, in turn, could lead them (2) to find in favor of parties claiming a
denial of their rights. We investigate both possibilities via an examination of constitutional
sex discrimination litigation in the 50 states—over a third of which have adopted ERAs.
Employing methods especially developed for this investigation, we find no direct effect of
the ERA on case outcomes. But we do identify an indirect effect: the presence of an ERA
significantly increases the likelihood of a court applying a higher standard of law, which in
turn significantly increases the likelihood of a decision favoring the equality claim.
Arbitrary gender lines still clutter the lawbooks and regulations
of the nation and states, the Supreme Court vacillates insecurely
from one decision to the next, and is sometimes disarmed from
reaching any decision, as it holds back doctrinal development
and awaits the signal the Equal Rights Amendment would sup-
ply. [Kay 2004, p. 18]
The leading recent example of . . . [a] rejected yet ultimately
triumphant [amendment] is the Equal Rights Amend-
ment. . . . Today, it is difficult to identify any respect in which
constitutional law is different from what it would have been
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if the ERA had been adopted. For the last quarter-century the
Supreme Court has acted as if the Constitution contains a pro-
vision forbidding discrimination on the basis of gender. [Strauss
2001, pp. 1476–77]
At a time when women are “entering the workforce, running for political
office, and seeking jobs once closed to them” in record numbers (Strauss
2001, p. 1505), does the American Constitution still need an Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA)? Surely women’s rights groups think so.
Whether fueled by the successful use of state equal rights amendments
in legal battles for same-sex marriage or by passage of the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment in 1992—203 years after it was proposed—they
have renewed their efforts to attain ratification of the amendment. Judg-
ing by the quotes above, however, the legal community is far less united
over an answer. On the one side are Kay (2004) and the many others
who argue that ratification of the ERA will clarify a particularly murky
area of the law and, in the process, generate a nearly irreversible sea
change in sex discrimination jurisprudence (Eskridge and Hunter 1997;
Kaufman 2001).1 That sea change, on this account, could come about
in one of two ways: directly, by prompting judges to take a more skeptical
view of sex-based discrimination or, as is more typically argued, indi-
rectly, by leading judges (1) to elevate the standard of law they now use
to adjudicate claims of sex discrimination, which, in turn, could lead
them (2) to find in favor of parties claiming a denial of their rights.
Either way, to put the argument more concretely, with the amendment
in place, courts would no longer uphold a wide range of sex-based
classifications that are currently permissible, such as those that make it
easier for children born out of wedlock overseas to become citizens if
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1. Commentary on the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) also attaches importance to
the symbolic value of the amendment (see, generally, Nussbaum 2000; Siegel 2001), but
these days it is the practical consequences that scholars tend to stress and that we emphasize
here as well.
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their mother, rather than their father, is a citizen (upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 [2001]), those
that place restrictions on abortion funding (upheld in Harris v. McCrae,
448 U.S. 297 [1980]), and those that limit the military draft to men
(upheld in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 [1981]).2
Momentarily we say more about these possible effects of a federal
ERA. For now we only wish to emphasize that, however familiar the
claims of its supporters,3 at least some scholars remain doubtful that the
amendment could produce any effect, direct or otherwise. Mansbridge
(1986) was among the first to express doubts about the ability of even
a formal constitutional rule to eradicate the force of societal pressures
and judicial ideology in the sex discrimination context; judges, she ar-
gued, would make their own determinations, either rejecting or em-
bracing the ERA’s ends. Strauss (2001) and others continue to make this
general argument today, although decidedly operating under the as-
sumption that courts have tended to choose the latter route. To these
commentators, it is difficult to see the need for the ERA’s instantiation
in the Constitution because decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have
largely fulfilled the amendment’s chief objectives. As for those objectives
that remain unfulfilled, an ERA, they maintain, is unlikely to be of much
added value given the flexibility courts enjoy in interpreting and applying
legal standards (Case 2000; Estrich 2002; Sherwin 1984–85; Post 2003).
Which side has the better case? Is an ERA likely to be as momentous
in effect as Kay predicts or little more than the constitutional redundancy
that Strauss foresees? Frankly, no one knows, nor can they know with
any degree of certainty: because the ERA is not yet a part of the federal
Constitution, we cannot observe its effect on either standards of law or
case outcomes. But we can make inferences about its impact by looking
to the U.S. states (see Gammie 1989; Hirczy de Mino 1997; Linton
1997). That is because over one-third have incorporated ERAs into their
constitutions—with many of those amendments containing similar lan-
2. For other examples, see Brake (1996); Daughtrey (2000); Eskridge and Hunter
(1997); Freund (1971); Gammie (1989); Halberstam and Defeis (1994); Hirczy de Mino
(1997); Hunter (2001); Kurland (1971).
3. Recall that altering the standard or rule used to adjudicate sex discrimination claims
(that is, elevating sex to a “suspect” classification; see Section 2 of this article) was a
primary motivation for the drive for (and against) the ERA in the 1970s (Brown et al.
1971; Dorsen and Ross 1971; Emerson 1971; Harvard Law Review 1970; Kay 1981, 1988;
Kurland 1971; Minnesota Law Review 1973; Mezey 1992; Vollers 1974)—and it remains
so today, into the 2000s (Eskridge and Hunter 1997; Farone 2000; Francis 2001; Hirczy
de Mino 1997; Kaufman 2001; Kay 2004; Lukey and Smagula 2000).
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guage and purporting to carry objectives analogous to the federal ERA
(see, for example, Crump 1973; Farone 2000). Hence, by examining the
standards used and the outcomes produced in constitutional sex dis-
crimination litigation in courts of last resort in states with and without
sex equality provisions, we may be able to gain leverage on the potential
effect (whether direct, indirect, or both) of a national ERA.
At the very least, this is the task we undertake in this article. Our
basic results, so that there will be no mystery about them, are relatively
straightforward. While we observe no direct effect of the ERA on case
outcomes, we do find, just as Kay (2004) and others assert, an indirect
effect: the presence of an ERA significantly increases the likelihood of
a court applying a higher standard of law, which, in turn, significantly
increases the likelihood of a decision favoring the equality claim. These
basic findings, as our emphasis on “relatively” indicates, are not without
their share of nuances. While ERAs do, in fact, affect the adjudication
of constitutional sex discrimination cases, they are just one of several
factors that explain judges’ choices over standards of law and the out-
comes that application of those standards produce.
We develop these findings in four steps. We begin with a brief dis-
cussion of claims about the effect of ERAs and flesh out the various
challenges to them. Next, we spell out our procedures for assessing
arguments about the importance (or lack thereof) of the amendment—
procedures that are attentive to the possible dependence between stan-
dards of law and outcomes as well as to other factors that may lead
judges to adopt particular standards and to reach particular conclusions.
We then describe the results yielded by these procedures and conclude
with a discussion of their implications for policy debates over the ERA
and, more broadly, for future empirical research on judicial decisions.
1. COURTS, SEX DISCRIMINATION, AND THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
Framed in its most general terms, Kay and other supporters of the ERA
make an argument hardly lacking proponents in the legal academy:
namely, formal and informal institutions—here, rules that structure ju-
dicial decisions—matter. In particular, some suggest that a formal con-
stitutional provision, an ERA, will have a direct effect on the nation’s
judiciary: its very presence in the Constitution, the argument goes, will
lead judges to be more skeptical of sex-based classifications and thus
more willing to eradicate them. The great bulk of scholars, though, assert
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that its effect will be more indirect: an ERA, on this account, (1) will
force judges, even those who oppose the amendment, to follow a dif-
ferent, higher standard (or rule) of law when adjudicating sex discrim-
ination cases and that (2) following this higher standard will, in turn,
lead to many more rulings in favor of litigants alleging discrimination.
This indirect or two-part argument about the effect of an ERA em-
anates from the way judges seem to analyze claims of discrimination
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.4 To assess
whether government actions run afoul of the clause, judges traditionally
(that is, through the 1970s) applied one of two standards. Under the
traditional rational basis test, as Table 1 shows, courts presume the
validity of whatever classification the government has made; it is up to
the party challenging the law to establish that it is irrational.5 Since this
burden is difficult to meet, many commentators argue that the rational
basis standard leads to a predictable outcome: courts defer to the gov-
ernment, generally upholding its classification (see, for example, Brown
et al. 1971; Epstein and Walker 2004; Kaufman 2001; Mezey 2003).
Until the 1970s, the vast majority of claims of discrimination pro-
ceeded under the rules of this traditional rational basis test—with one
particularly relevant exception: race. In light of the history surrounding
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has held
that classifications based on race should be subject to a less surmountable
standard, known as strict scrutiny (or suspect class). Under this standard,
judges presume that a government action is suspect or unconstitutional;
only by showing that the law is the least restrictive means available to
achieve a compelling state interest can the government overcome that
presumption (see Table 1). Given the difficulty of making this showing,
the conventional view among scholars is that application of the strict-
scrutiny test (apart from the affirmative action context) leads to out-
comes just as predictable as those under the rational basis test—only,
of course, in the opposite direction: when courts apply this stricter test,
they almost always rule in favor of the party alleging discrimination.
Or, as Gunther (1971, p. 8) once famously put it, the suspect class test
is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact,” whereas the traditional rational
4. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is restricted to the states;
the governing constitutional provision for claims of discrimination against the federal gov-
ernment is the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. For the purposes of our
discussion on sex discrimination, the two clauses are interchangeable.
5. We adapt the discussion in this section from Epstein and Walker (2004, pp. 652–54).
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Table 1. Equal Protection Tests
Test
Example of
Application Validity Standard
Rational basis Age discrimination The law must be a reasonable
measure designed to achieve a
legitimate government purpose
Intermediate scrutiny Sex discrimination The law must be substantially
related to the achievement of an
important objective
Strict scrutiny Race discrimination The law must be the least restrictive
means available to achieve a
compelling state interest
Data source. Epstein and Walker (2004, p. 645).
basis standard provides “minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none
in fact.”6
It is thus no wonder that as part of their effort to eradicate discrim-
ination, women’s rights groups, beginning in the late 1960s, attempted
to convince courts that sex-based classifications ought to be subject to
strict scrutiny rather than to a rational basis analysis (see, for example,
Daughtrey 2000). Their litigation efforts did not succeed, but neither
did they wholly fail. In response to their claims, the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1976 articulated a new standard—often called intermediate or height-
ened scrutiny—that falls somewhere in between rational basis and strict
scrutiny. Under it, the challenged law must be substantially related to
the achievement of an important government objective (see Table 1).7
To be sure, many argue that application of intermediate scrutiny leads
to more favorable outcomes for parties alleging gender discrimination
than did the traditional standard (for example, Case 2000; Goldstein
1994). At the same time, though, they suggest that the intermediate
6. Justice O’Connor has taken issue with this claim, asserting that strict scrutiny is
not always “strict in theory, but fatal in fact” (Adarand Constructors v. Pen˜a [515 U.S.
200]). This is true with regard to affirmative action programs, but for all other race-based
classifications, most contemporary commentators suggest that Gunther’s assertion remains
apt (Epstein and Walker 2004; Farber, Eskridge, and Frickey 2003; Mezey 2003). When
it comes to sex-based classifications, however, some aver that O’Connor’s view may have
considerable merit. For more on this point, see note 9.
7. Some justices have pushed for a variation on this approach that would require an
“exceedingly persuasive justification” to sustain a sex-based classification (see Justice Gins-
burg’s opinion for the Court in United States v. Virginia [518 U.S. 15]). However, in light
of recent Court decisions, such as Nguyen v. INS (533 U.S. 53), that effort has apparently
failed (Bowsher 1998; Stobaugh 2002; Weinrib 2003).
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approach, as opposed to rational basis or strict scrutiny, produces far
less predictable results: the Court may more often than not void sex-
based classifications, but it more than occasionally upholds them (see,
for example, Brake 1996; Kay 2004; Mezey 2003). Data derived from
the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database (Spaeth 1999)—
showing that the party alleging sex discrimination prevailed in just
slightly more than a majority of the 23 post-1976 suits (60 percent)—
tend to support this belief, as do doctrinal analyses of Court decisions.
In United States v. Virginia (518 U.S. 515 [1996]), the federal govern-
ment invited the justices to apply strict scrutiny to sex-based classifi-
cations—an invitation that many scholars (for example, Dorf 2002; Sun-
stein 1996), along with Justice Scalia, say the majority nearly accepted
when it attempted to ratchet up the intermediate-scrutiny standard to
strike down Virginia Military Institute’s all-male admissions policy. Just
5 years later, in Nguyen v. INS (533 U.S. 53), however, the Court upheld
a federal law that privileges a mother over a father in citizenship pro-
ceedings. While the majority proclaimed that the sex-based classification
created by the law achieved important government interests and, as such,
passed the heightened scrutiny test, Justice O’Connor disagreed. In a
vigorous dissent, she accused the Court of explaining and applying
“heightened scrutiny [in a] manner [that] is a stranger to our precedents”
(533 U.S. at 74). “No one,” she wrote, “should mistake the majority’s
analysis for a careful application of this Court’s equal protection juris-
prudence concerning sex-based classifications. Today’s decision instead
represents a deviation from a line of cases in which we have vigilantly
applied heightened scrutiny to such classifications to determine whether
a constitutional violation has occurred. I trust that the depth and vitality
of these precedents will ensure that today’s error remains an aberration”
(533 U.S. at 97). In short, O‘Connor “not so subtly implied that the
majority had, in effect, not applied intermediate scrutiny, but rational
basis review” (Deutsch 2003, p. 187).
And therein lies the rub: without an ERA, according to many com-
mentators, the justices will continue to invoke (or perhaps ignore) the
murky intermediate rule, upholding or voiding classifications as they see
fit, and judges on state and lower federal courts will do the same or
even concoct their own approaches to sex discrimination (see, for ex-
ample, Brake 1996; Francis 2001; Kay 2004; Mezey 2003). But with an
ERA, jurists will be forced (1) to elevate sex to a suspect class, which
in turn will lead them (2) to eradicate virtually all sex-based classifi-
cations (that is, not just 60 percent), as they now do in the case of race.
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This last sentence encapsulates what we have called an indirect (or
two-part) claim about the ERA’s effect—and it is certainly not one lack-
ing in support or plausibility. Scores of scholarly analyses point to its
merit (see, for example, Brown et al. 1971; Dorsen and Ross 1971;
Emerson 1971; Eskridge and Hunter 1997; Farone 2000; Ginsburg 1978,
1979; Harvard Law Review 1970; Kaufman 2001; Kay 1981, 1988,
2004; Lukey and Smagula 2000; Minnesota Law Review 1973; Vollers
1974), friends and foes of the ERA alike post it on their Web sites (see,
for example, Eagle Forum 2004; National Council of Women’s Orga-
nizations 2004), the history of race discrimination litigation portends it
(see, for example, Farber, Eskridge, and Frickey 2003; Greenberg 1976),
and even U.S. Supreme Court justices have suggested as much; indeed,
in the early 1970s, several declined to elevate sex to a suspect class at
least in part because they thought it “inappropriate to ‘amend’ the Con-
stitution while the ERA was pending” (Eskridge and Hunter 1997, p.
78; see also Ginsburg 1978, 1979).
Even so, as we noted at the outset, claims about the effect of an ERA,
whether direct or indirect, are hardly without their share of critics.
Strauss (2001, p. 1459) has famously argued that because they typically
serve to “ratify changes that have already taken place in society,” most
successful (and unsuccessful) constitutional amendments are “irrele-
vant”; they will have neither direct or indirect effects on society. Then
there are those commentators who take square aim at the ERA, alleging
that even specific claims about its indirect effect may be misguided. One
set, for example, asserts that the amendment’s presence would not nec-
essarily ensure adoption of strict scrutiny and that its absence does not
automatically negate it (Brake 1996; Denning and Vile 2000; Gammie
1989; Kaufman 2001; O’Neill 1993; Sherwin 1984–85). In support, they
point to federal courts that have all but ignored the current intermediate
standard and have instead invoked higher or lower rules as they so desire;
they also point to state courts of last resort that have used the inter-
mediate or even rational basis standard to adjudicate sex discrimination
cases even if their constitution contains an ERA, as well as to supreme
courts that invoke strict scrutiny in the absence of an ERA.8 Many more
8. Of course, federal courts are supposed to adhere to legal principles established by
the U.S. Supreme Court, and state courts are supposed to view federal law as establishing
a floor (although not a ceiling) on civil rights and liberties below which they cannot go.
But as the numerous studies we cite in the text—not to mention our own reading of the
cases—indicate, these norms do not always hold, at least not in this area of the law. Even
the U.S. Supreme Court occasionally departs from its own standard to adjudicate sex
discrimination cases (see Mezey 2003).
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commentators, though, aver that, even if the ERA prompted courts to
apply strict scrutiny, it would make little difference in how they treat
sex-based classification. Leading the way here is Mansbridge (1986, pp.
50–51), who argues that the ERA “would almost certainly have made
sex at least a ‘suspect’ classification” but that “treating sex merely as a
‘suspect’ classification would [leave judges] free to strike down any stat-
ute involving sex discrimination that did not in their view have a com-
pelling justification, while leaving them free to uphold any statute that
they thought did have compelling justification” (see also Case 2000;
Mezey 2003; Schoen 1978; Sherwin 1984–85; Stanford Law Review
1950; Tarr and Porter 1982).9
What these analyses underscore, to frame their critiques more
broadly, is an argument advanced in study after study of judicial deci-
sions; namely, while institutions—whether formal (such as constitutional
dictates) or informal (such as legal principles)—may matter, they are not
as determinative of outcomes as claims about the ERA’s effects make
them out to be. Indeed, the extant social science literature on judging
typically defines institutions as sets of rules that structure interactions
(see, for example, Epstein and Knight 1998; Murphy 1964), not as rules
that establish outcomes, and it typically views the choices judges make
as a function of many other forces, including the judges’ own political
preferences and personal attributes, features of the external environment
in which they deliberate, and the characteristics of the particular suits
they must resolve (see, for example, Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn 1999;
Cross and Tiller 1998; George and Epstein 1992; Gryski, Main, and
Dixon 1986; Pinello 2003; Revesz 1997; Segal, Cameron, and Songer
1995).
In emphasizing this point, we do not mean to suggest that the social
science literature dismisses rules altogether. While a number of individual
scholars may subscribe to this view (or, at the very least, do not build
institutions into their decision-making models), many others do not—
as exemplified by studies arguing that particular types of institutions for
selecting judges may be more likely than others to induce sophisticated
judicial behavior (for example, Bright and Keenan 1995; Burbank and
Barry 2002; Tabarrok and Helland 1999) and those explaining why
formal constitutional dictates and the norm favoring respect for prec-
9. These (largely doctrinal) analyses indicate that (1) courts applying the same standard
to assess the same sex-based classification at roughly the same point in time do not always
reach the same conclusion and that (2) courts applying rational basis do not always uphold
sex-based classifications and courts applying suspect scrutiny do not always strike them.
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edent may serve to constrain judges, even those who prefer different
rules (for example, Caminker 1994; Knight and Epstein 1996; see also
Richards and Kritzer 2002). What we do mean to suggest, rather, is that
in none of these studies, or in any others we can identify, are the authors
contending (in contrast to ERA supporters) that institutions determine
outcomes in all circumstances and in all matters. In fact, a central mes-
sage in the extant literature on judging (see especially George and Epstein
1992; Pinello 2003; Segal, Cameron, and Songer 1995) and the basic
point of Mansbridge’s (1986) analysis of the potential effect of an ERA
is that rules may constrain courts, but they do not—as so much com-
mentary on the amendment seems to maintain—mechanically lead them
to make particular choices; many other factors may come into play.
2. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS
These sorts of critiques, coupled with the lack of empirical scrutiny,
underscore the importance of assessing assertions about the impact of
the ERA. While there may be good reasons to believe that ERAs will
generate outcomes more favorable to parties alleging discrimination ei-
ther directly or by structuring the standards that judges employ to ad-
judicate such disputes, there are equally good reasons to question that
belief. At the very least, these claims strike us and others as asking too
much of formal and informal rules. While rules certainly can serve to
structure choices, it seems imprudent to believe that they do all the
work—especially when so many studies of judging suggest otherwise.
Of course, we can assess these various perspectives empirically. As
we noted at the outset, an investigation into the standards used and
outcomes produced in constitutional sex discrimination cases in the na-
tion’s 50 state courts of last resort10—those operating in legal environ-
ments with and without an ERA—should permit us to draw inferences
about the validity of direct and indirect claims. So too such an inves-
tigation ought to facilitate assessments of the arguments of some, that
an ERA will produce no effect on courts; of others, that it will not
necessarily lead to the application of strict scrutiny; and of yet a third
group, that application of strict scrutiny will not necessarily lead to
predictable, pro-equality outcomes; that rather in all instances other
10. For ease of explication, we use the terms “state court of last resort” and “state
supreme court” interchangeably even though we recognize that some state courts of last
resort are not named “supreme court.”
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factors play a crucial role explaining judicial choices. To be sure, our
assessment of these claims, as well as any inferences we may draw about
the effect of an ERA, will be of a higher (that is, more certain) quality
for the context we can observe—the states—than for the one we cannot
observe—the federal level. Nonetheless, in light of the methodological
tack we take, which entails controlling for many factors relevant to state
and federal judging, not to mention the similar language and purposes
of the state and national amendments, we should be able to gain some
leverage on the potential effect(s) of a national ERA.
It is to this methodological approach that we now turn. In what
directly follows, we describe the procedures we used to gather data on
our unit of analysis (constitutional sex discrimination cases), the vari-
ables we incorporated into our statistical model, and the method we
employed to estimate the model. Sections 3 and 4 detail the results
yielded by these procedures.
2.1. The Unit of Analysis: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Cases
To assess the possible effects of an ERA, we set out to collect data on
all constitutional sex discrimination cases resolved in state courts of last
resort between 1960 and 1999.11 This proved a challenging task. No
equivalent of Spaeth’s (2005) United States Supreme Court Judicial Da-
tabase exists for state supreme courts, and searches of electronic re-
sources (such as LEXIS or Westlaw) are unlikely to produce all the
relevant suits.
In light of these obstacles, scholars investigating state court decisions
have developed their case lists from multiple sources. In amassing his
database on gay rights litigation, for example, Pinello (2003) conducted
computer-aided searches and drew on scholarly writings on the subject.
We generally followed suit. In our quest to uncover all constitutional
sex discrimination cases, we too performed various LEXIS searches and
systematically extracted cases from extant literature on the subject.12
Heeding the lessons of research by Gryski, Main, and Dixon (1986),
11. We settled on this time frame for reasons practical (the existence, as we explain
later in the text, of valid and reliable measures of judicial preferences), analytical (a sufficient
time line pre- and postratification of most state ERAs), and jurisprudential (an ample period
since the instantiation of contemporary equal protection doctrine).
12. The project’s Web site provides the details of these searches, including the terms
we entered into LEXIS, to identify the cases and the literature (http://epstein.wustl.edu/
research/ERA.html).
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however, we supplemented these sources by “shepardizing” the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s major constitutional sex discrimination cases.13
After perusing each opinion unearthed by these various procedures—
mainly to ensure that the court in question was the state court of last
resort, that the dispute was real and not hypothetical, and that, in the
course of resolving the suit, the state justices addressed a claim of con-
stitutional sex discrimination14—we were left with 416 cases.15 Of
course, we cannot say that we identified each and every pertinent case,
but like Pinello (2003), we do not believe we missed many. We also can
say that our procedures are reproducible, replicable, and capable of being
updated and backdated.
2.2. Variables Incorporated into the Analysis
With the 416 cases in hand, we set out to collect the information nec-
essary to animate the three primary variables of interest: (1) the presence
or absence of an ERA, (2) the standards courts use to adjudicate sex
discrimination claims, and (3) case outcomes. We also amassed data
designed to assess the various factors suggested by previous studies of
judging that may affect the standard used, the case outcome, or both.
We elaborate on these below.
2.2.1. Variables of Primary Interest: An Equal Rights Amendment, the Stan-
dard of Law, and the Outcome. The direct claim about the ERA’s effect
is straightforward enough: the presence of an ERA should lead courts
to reach decisions in favor of parties alleging discrimination. The linch-
pin of the indirect (or two-part) claim also is the presence (or absence)
of an ERA, but standards intervene: it is an ERA, under the indirect
claim, that necessitates the use of a higher standard of law, but it is the
13. Shepard’s enables researchers to identify all cases citing to a particular case. A list
of the 13 court cases we shepardized is available on our Web site.
14. Specifically, we excluded courts in the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico and
eliminated the handful of advisory opinions produced by our searches because not all state
courts have the authority to issue these sorts of opinions. In light of the purpose of our
project, an additional criterion was that the court invoked a standard of law (see Table 1)
to adjudicate the sex-based claim. Since we return to this point later (see Section 2.2.1),
suffice it to note here that in secondary analyses designed to assess the robustness of our
results, we incorporated those cases in which the court failed to apply a standard (by
adding the variable zero to the Standard variable; see Section 2.2.1). The results, which
are housed on our Web site, were remarkably stable and consistent with those depicted in
Tables 2 and 3 (see Sections 3 and 4).
15. The project’s Web site houses a full replication archive, including a database con-
taining all the cases and variables we used in this study and the documentation necessary
to reproduce our results.
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application of a higher standard of law that generates an outcome fa-
vorable to the party alleging discrimination. To put it another way, in
the first part of this two-part claim, the ERA is the key causal variable
and the standard is the dependent variable; in the second part, the stan-
dard serves as the key causal variable, and the outcome, the dependent
variable.
Measuring the first independent variable of the indirect claim (and
the only one of interest in the direct claim), the presence of an ERA, is
a relatively straightforward task, requiring us to do little more than
determine whether an ERA was in effect (coded as one)16 or not (coded
as zero) at the time the court resolved the case.17
Turning next to the standard of law, which serves as both a dependent
and an independent variable in assessing the indirect claim, we code each
into one of the three categories depicted in Table 1: 1, rational basis
(minimal scrutiny); 2, intermediate (heightened) scrutiny; or 3, strict
scrutiny (suspect class).18 Since our replication archive houses a detailed
coding instrument, suffice it to mention here the primary problem we
encountered: cases in which we could not identify a standard because
either the court simply did not apply or articulate one or because it
explicitly refused to select among various alternatives. We exclude these
cases from our primary analysis (that is, they are not among the 416),
but we include them ( ) in supplemental investigations designedNp 51
to assess the robustness of our results.
Finally, investigating both direct and indirect claims requires infor-
mation about the outcome of the litigation. Here we take the approach
commended by Gryski, Main, and Dixon (1986), among others, and
code whether the party alleging sex discrimination won (equal to one)
or lost (equal to zero) the dispute.19
16. A list of the 18 ERA states along with the date and exact wording of their sex
equality provisions is available on our Web site.
17. As our emphasis on “relatively” indicates, we encountered several (fairly minor)
problems in coding this variable. We describe these on the project’s Web site, as well as
the steps we took to account for them in our analyses.
18. The project’s Web site houses our coding rules, along with the results of our
reliability analysis on the coding of this variable.
19. We are well aware of normative debates among some feminists about whether, as
Goldstein (1994, p. 209) puts it, “to argue for protective legislation for women on the
grounds that without such legislation women are unfairly disadvantaged by making them
play by rules that were designed with men in mind, and that are ill-adapted to women’s
biology and life patterns.” While we appreciate this argument, our coding scheme remains
relatively agnostic over it (for example, if a pregnant woman fired from her job is the
plaintiff in a suit alleging sex-based discrimination in violation of her constitutional rights,
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2.2.2. Other Factors Influencing Judicial Decisions. These three vari-
ables—(1) the presence or absence of an ERA, (2) the standards courts
apply to sex discrimination claims, and (3) case outcomes—provide us
with the information essential to scrutinize claims about the ERA’s pos-
sible effects. What we lack are the data necessary to assess challenges
to those claims or, for that matter, any argument that emphasizes the
utter determinacy of rules. Examining such challenges requires us to
attend to the other forces that come to bear on judging—specifically,
those that may influence the two dependent variables of our study, the
standard of law and the case outcome. From a close reading of the
literature, as we allude above, emerge two sets of factors relevant to the
choice of standard: features of the state supreme court and of the external
sociolegal environment in which it operates. Some of the same factors
also may shape the outcomes of the disputes but, to account fully for
them, we also must consider an additional set: specific characteristics of
sex discrimination suits.
Beginning with features of the court, existing research emphasizes
two. One is the political preference of the majority of its members, as
structured by the institutions used to select them. This last clause is
crucial, for, again as we noted earlier, many analysts argue that particular
types of selection systems are more likely than others to induce sophis-
ticated behavior on the part of actors—such that the greater the ac-
countability established in the institution, the higher the opportunity
costs for judges to act sincerely, and, accordingly, the more extensive
sophisticated behavior will be (for example, Bright and Keenan 1995;
Burbank and Friedman 2002; Hall 1987). On this account, then, the
decisions of elected judges will be more in line with popular sentiment,
and those of appointed judges more on track with the preferences of
the governmental regime (see, for example, Croly 1995; Dahl 1957;
Gryski, Main, and Dixon 1986; Pinello 1995; Tabarrok and Helland
1999). Standard partisan-based measures of the judicial preferences—
she would be the party alleging sex discrimination). We also understand the position of
some scholars that a formal rule, such as an ERA, will not effectively end the subordination
of women by men at least in part because of the “problem of male dominance in virtually
all facets of social, political, and economic life” (MacKinnon 1987, p. 762; see also Becker
1989; Case 2002). To be sure, we do not attempt to assess this position, but our analysis
does lend support to the claims of Sullivan (2002) and others who argue that formal equality
provisions are not always inefficacious but rather that their effectiveness depends a good
deal on who is interpreting them. Specifically, to foreshadow our results, we find that as
the fraction of women serving on a state supreme court increases, the likelihood of the
court adopting a higher standard of law also increases—and significantly increases at that.
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such as the proportion of Democrats on the bench—are thus inappro-
priate for this reason and for another unique to our study: during the
years under analysis here, the political parties switched positions on the
ERA (Wolbrecht 2000), thereby making any proxy of preferences that
relies primarily on partisanship (including party-adjusted ideology
scores; see Langer 2004) even more dubious for our purposes. But there
is one measure that nicely fits our needs: the government and citizen
ideology scores Berry et al. (1998) developed and assigned to each state
for each year between 1960 and 1999.20 Operating under an assumption
common in many studies—that we can assess the preferences of state
justices on the basis of the ideology of the citizenry (if they are elected
via partisan or nonpartisan ballots) and on the basis of the government
(if they are appointed)—we assigned a Berry et al. score to each case in
the database, depending on the selection system in effect at the time the
court resolved the dispute. Given the way Berry and his colleagues com-
puted the scores (with higher numbers representing higher degrees of
liberalism), we expect a positive relationship between the scores and
standards: the higher the score (that is, the more liberal the court), the
more likely it is to apply a higher standard of review; we also anticipate
that liberal courts will reach more equality-oriented outcomes.
A second feature of the court worthy of inclusion centers on the
presence of women justices. Virtually from the day Sherry (1986) penned
her classic work on the possibility of a feminine jurisprudence, scholars
have hotly debated whether female judges “speak in a different voice”
(for recent reviews of this literature, see, for example, Epstein and
Mather 2003; Kay and Sparrow 2001; Schneider 2001). While the results
of various research projects exploring judicial votes are decidedly mixed,
those centering on jurisprudence—especially in the area of sex discrim-
ination—are clearer. A consensus now exists that women have “pushed
the law forward in sex discrimination cases” (Kay and Sparrow 2001,
p. 11), with their distinct approach to legal principles possibly altering
the choices made by their male colleagues (Sherry 1986; Sullivan 2002).
20. Berry et al. (1998) report scores for the period 1960–93. We used the updated and
revised scores (through 1999) (“revised 1960–1999 government/citizen ideology series”)
that Berry and his colleagues deposited with the Inter-university Consortium for Political
and Social Research (Study No. 128). By necessity, partisanship is a factor—albeit one
among many—that figures into the government measure.
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On the basis of this consensus,21 we think it reasonable to hypothesize
that the greater the fraction of female justices on the court, the greater
the probability of the adoption of a higher standard of law.22
These variables relate to features of the court; a second set pertains
to the sociolegal environment in which the court operates. A relevant
factor along these lines is whether an intermediate appellate court existed
at the time the court decided the case (coded one if it existed and zero
otherwise). Scholars include this variable in almost all models of state
court decisions out of the belief that appellate tribunals “siphon off
routine cases” (Gryski, Main, and Dixon 1986, p. 145), leaving the more
serious matters for courts of last resort to resolve. In the context of our
study, the presence of these courts thus should increase the likelihood
of the court applying a higher standard of review, as well as finding in
favor of the party alleging discrimination, “since frivolous appeals will
be screened by the intermediate appellate courts, and the high courts
will be evaluating only the more serious claims of sex discrimination”
(Gryski, Main, and Dixon 1986, p. 145; see also Atkins and Glick 1976;
Canon and Jaros 1970).
A second variable centering on the sociolegal environment is the
state’s level of enthusiasm for the national ERA, which we also can
capture with a simple dichotomous variable: whether the state ratified
the federal amendment (equal to one) or not (equal to zero). Because
this may provide important information to the justices about the public’s
receptivity to the application of a higher standard of law to resolve sex
discrimination cases, it may very well exert an influence on that choice
quite apart from the presence (or, more pointedly, absence) of a state
ERA. At the very least, ratification of the federal ERA could send state
justices precisely the opposite signal that the failure to ratify sent to their
federal counterparts; namely, they would not be usurping their state’s
political process if they elevated sex to a suspect class (Eskridge and
Hunter 1997; Ginsburg 1978). Accordingly, we expect justices operating
21. Note that because this consensus is over jurisprudence and not votes, our hy-
pothesis pertains to standards and not outcomes. We did, however, assess whether the
fraction of female justices affects outcomes. As it turns out, the variable produces a positive
but insignificant coefficient—although it in no way affects the basic findings reported in
Table 3.
22. Allen and Wall (1993) contains data on women serving on state courts of last
resort between 1922 and 1992; we updated this information from various sources, including
court Web sites.
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in states that ratified the national ERA to apply a higher standard of
review.
As our discussion so far suggests, we foresee that various features of
the courts and of the environment in which they operate will affect both
the standards they apply and the outcomes they reach. There is yet a
third set that we anticipate will influence only the latter: characteristics
of the litigation. The general idea here is that even if the justices adopt
a particular standard of law to adjudicate sex discrimination claims,
they will apply it to reach different outcomes depending on the features
of the case (see, for example, Beck and Baker 1993; Mansbridge 1986;
McCausland 1983; Mezey 2003; Simpson 1977).
Operating under this logic, we combed the extant normative and
doctrinal literature to identify relevant characteristics of the litigation
that may affect case outcomes. Three emerged in virtually every analysis:
whether or not (1) the government defended a sex-based classification,
(2) the government or another party defended the classification on the
basis of a relevant physical difference between men and women, and
(3) a woman claimed discrimination. Our expectation about the gov-
ernment’s involvement is simple enough: when, as a party or an amicus
curiae, it defends a sex-based classification, we expect the likelihood of
defeat for the litigant alleging a violation of his or her rights to increase.
This hypothesis reflects a voluminous literature in both the federal and
state judicial contexts demonstrating that courts defer to the govern-
ment—especially in criminal cases (see, for example, Atkins and Glick
1976; Emmert 1992; Glick and Vines 1973; Gryski, Main, and Dixon
1986; Traut and Emmert 1998; Wheeler et al. 1987; Yale Law Journal
1978). For our purposes, we simply incorporate a variable indicating
government involvement (coded as one) or not (coded as zero), but we
also, in a supplementary analysis, control for the type of suit (criminal
or civil).
With regard to the second case characteristic, scholars are virtually
unanimous in their belief that a defense of discrimination on the basis
of a relevant physical difference makes it more difficult for both federal
and state courts to resolve the dispute in favor of the party alleging
discrimination—regardless of the standard of law they use (see, for ex-
ample, Epstein and Walker 2004; Kay 1981; Mezey 2003). Hirczy de
Mino’s (1997) doctrinal analysis of the Texas high-court decisions, for
example, finds that even when the justices apply an elevated standard,
they tend to rule against the equality claim in litigation involving a
physical difference (he specifically points to toplessness). Mezey (2003)
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and many others make a similar point about federal jurists, explaining
that some have downright asserted that courts ought apply a different
standard when such differences arise. The resulting hypothesis, then, is
straightforward: if a defense based on a relevant physical distinction
arises in the litigation (coded one if yes and zero if no), we anticipate
that the justices will find against the party alleging discrimination.
Far less straightforward is the role of women litigants in increasing
or decreasing the probability of success for the party alleging inequity.
In perhaps the most systematic analysis of litigation in this area, Gryski,
Main, and Dixon (1986) found that state tribunals are more sympathetic
to claims of discrimination made by females than by males, and Mezey
(2003) has suggested much the same of the U.S. Supreme Court. Given
the perceived purpose of an ERA, these results might not seem partic-
ularly surprising, but some observers have balked. Various feminist legal
scholars, for example, have argued that the male-dominated judiciary
manipulates seemingly equally oriented principles to reach outcomes that
further the interests of its “own kind”23 and doctrinal analyses of cases
in Texas and Pennsylvania, two states with an ERA, suggest the plau-
sibility of this view (Hirczy de Mino 1997; Beck and Baker 1993). These
conflicting findings make hypothesizing difficult; yet in light of the more
systematic evidence marshaled in the Gryski, Main, and Dixon (1986)
and Mezey (2003) studies, we expect the probability of success for the
party alleging discrimination to increase when that party is a female
(coded one; coded zero if not a female).
2.3. Statistical Models and Estimation Methods
As we have just outlined it, our analysis is aimed at assessing both direct
and indirect claims about the ERA’s impact. In terms of the former, we
expect six factors to affect case outcome: an ERA, of course, and then
the preferences of the court, the existence of an intermediate appellate
court, a female as the equality party, a claim of a physical difference
between men and women, and the government as a defender of the sex-
based classification. As for the indirect account, we incorporate four
variables, in addition to the presence of an ERA, to account for the
standard of law applied by the court (the preferences of the court, na-
tional ERA ratification, the proportion of the court composed of women,
and the existence of an intermediate appellate court), and five, in ad-
dition to the standard of law (but not the ERA), to account for the
23. See note 19.
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outcome (once again, the preferences of the court, the existence of an
intermediate appellate court, a female as the equality party, a claim of
a physical difference between men and women, and the government as
a defender of the sex-based classification). Since Appendix A provides
a summary of these variables, we need only mention here that, given
our coding scheme, we expect all the variables to be positively related
to the standard of law. We also expect all but two (a claim of a physical
difference between men and women and the government as a defender
of the sex-based classification) to be positively related to case outcome;
for those two, we anticipate a negative relationship.24
Assessing these expectations as they pertain to the direct account is
hardly problematic: we can simply regress the outcome of the litigation
(for or against the party alleging discrimination) on the six variables of
interest to determine the ERA’s impact on judging. Investigating the
more indirect (or two-part) account, however, presents a technical chal-
lenge of no small proportions: because we aim to explore the assumption
that the choice of standard and the outcome are dependent, we must
analyze two equations, with two differentially measured dependent var-
iables—standard of law (an ordinal variable) and outcome (a dichoto-
mous variable)—in one model. Since no standard statistical model will
adequately perform this task, we developed one: a bivariate mixed-
response probit model, which allows for correlation across two equa-
tions and which we estimate using the maximum likelihood method.
Appendix B provides the details of this statistical model, along with
our estimation methods. What is important here is that even though the
parameter estimates resulting from these procedures admit to an inter-
pretation akin to probit coefficients, our methodological approach is
distinctive in two regards. First, it enables us to estimate parameters
that—while substantively similar to those that would result from ana-
lyzing decisions over standards of law and case outcomes indepen-
dently—are more efficient because we employ all the data to obtain them.
Second, the approach facilitates a more exacting investigation of the
dependence between the choices of standard and outcome (that is, the
dependence assumed by the indirect, two-part claim) because we are
able to obtain a precise estimate of that dependence (in the form of an
estimate of a correlation parameter, r) as a result of our ability to control
24. These represent the variables in (and concomitant expectations of) our primary
analyses. As we have noted throughout, we consider variations in an effort to assess the
robustness of our results. See Section 4 for the details.
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for the factors that may affect both the standard and outcome in one
model.
3. THE DIRECT EFFECT OF EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENTS
As we have implied throughout, most scholars writing in the sex dis-
crimination area have argued that the ERA’s effect will come primarily,
if not exclusively, through its impact on legal standards. Assertions that
the ERA’s mere presence in the Constitution will be sufficient to prompt
judges to eradicate sex discrimination do, to be sure, appear in the
literature, but they are, relative to indirect accounts, few and far between.
Our results suggest that they should remain sparse. As we can see in
Table 2, while all but one of the control variables produce statistically
significant coefficients (in the hypothesized direction), the ERA does not.
And further interrogation of the data does little to change this basic
result. So, for example, a model that incorporates the standard of law
invoked by the court, along with all the other variables depicted in Table
2, also returns a statistically insignificant coefficient on the ERA variable.
The same holds for each and every analysis we conducted, including
models that take into account variables we expect to affect legal stan-
dards (rather than outcome) (see Table 3), such as state ratification of
the federal ERA and the proportion of female judges on the bench.25
4. THE INDIRECT EFFECT OF EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENTS
These supplemental analyses, not to mention the results depicted in Table
2, show that the mere presence of an ERA in a constitution has little
impact on judges’ decisions: no direct effect, in other words, emerges.
Quite a different conclusion obtains when we turn to indirect effects.
In fact, estimating the bivariate mixed-response probit model leads to
results that are quite striking: all the variables, as we can see in Table
3, produce statistically significant coefficients, and in the expected di-
rection. The r estimate, which indicated the correlation between the
standard of law used and the outcome reached, also attains statistical
significance.
25. In addition to these attempts to verify the results displayed in Table 2, we also
considered other factors (including the possibility of endogeneity) that might have affected
the estimates given our use of observational data. See note 28 for more details.
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Table 2. Maximum Likelihood Estimates for a Probit Model Fit to the State
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Data
Variable
Maximum
Likelihood
Estimate
Standard
Error
ERA .158 .142
Judicial Ideology .017 .004*
Intermediate Appellate Court .359 .158*
Physical Difference .721 .171*
Government Opposition .856 .138*
Female .273 .148
Constant .715 .233*
Note. ; . The dependent variable is the outcomeNp 416 ln Lp 236.8399
(for or against the party alleging sex discrimination).
* Statistically significant at the level.ap .05
Taken collectively, these basic results lend support to claims about
an indirect effect of the ERA—but not without important caveats. In
what follows we explore those caveats, which emerge from an exami-
nation of the substantive impact of our findings. But two points deserve
emphasis before we proceed further. The first is that while Table 3 reflects
our primary thinking about the impact of state ERAs, a sufficient number
of concerns about our measures and specification—many of which we
raised in Section 2—led us to undertake a full-fledged assessment of the
robustness of our principal results.26 Our Web site contains a reckoning
of this assessment, but the main point here is that it leads to no changes
in the interpretation we offer below: in none of these alternative spec-
ifications did the parameter estimates for the ERA and r fail to reach
statistical significance.
A second point also relates to the integrity of the results displayed
in Table 3 but centers on a potential problem caused by our data (rather
than our measures)—specifically, that they cluster by court and time.
While an insufficient amount of data exist to model extra court or time
26. So, for example, we incorporated the 51 cases in which the court did not articulate
a standard and added the value of zero to the Standard variable to account for these cases,
redefined value one of the ERA variable to include only states ratifying their amendment
in the 1970s, included a variable to differentiate criminal and civil cases, and added the
variable representing the proportion of women to the outcome equation—to name just a
few of the checks we conducted (see our Web site for others). As we note in the text, the
results were remarkably stable and consistent with those depicted in Table 3—with one
notable exception: although including the proportion-of-women variable does not alter any
of the other results in Table 3, it fails to significantly affect case outcomes.
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Table 3. Maximum Likelihood Estimates and (Asymptotic) Standard Errors for
the Bivariate Mixed-Response Probit Model Fit to the State Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Data
Parameter
Maximum
Likelihood
Estimate
Standard
Error
:b1
Constant 1.106 .189*
ERA .460 .120*
Judicial Ideology .011 .004*
ERA Ratification .456 .143*
Proportion Women 2.187 .566*
Intermediate Appellate Court .354 .138*
: Cut Pointt1 1.179 .084*
:b2
Constant .794 .225*
Judicial Ideology .017 .004*
Intermediate Appellate Court .376 .153*
Physical Difference .685 .160*
Government Opposition .725 .130*
Female .376 .138*
r: Correlation .532 .060*
Note. ; . The dependent variable in equation (1)Np 416 ln Lp 593.0884
( variables) is standard of law; the dependent variable in equation (2) (b b1 2
variables) is outcome; r represents the correlation between the two equations.
* Statistically significant at the level.ap .05
dependence, we went to some length to ensure that our inferences were
not unduly affected by possible clustering. Specifically, we recomputed
our standard errors (clustering by court, decision year, and court within
decision year) using the White (1980) sandwich estimator, which gen-
erates standard errors that remain consistent even in the face of un-
modeled dependence due to clustering.27 When we invoke these standard
errors, rather than the asymptotic ones reported above, the results do
not change markedly;28 most important, the key variables of interest (an
ERA and the standard of law) are not affected whatsoever. Accordingly,
27. See Appendix B for details; the robust standard errors are included in the replication
archive on our Web site.
28. Specifically, when clustering by year, all coefficients remain statistically significant;
when clustering by court, the Intermediate Appellate Court variable becomes insignificant
in the standard equation; when clustering by court within year, the Government Opposition
and Female variables become insignificant in the outcome equation.
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for the substantive interpretation to follow in Section 4.1, we rely on
the regular (asymptotic) standard errors.29
4.1. The Indirect (Two-Part) Claim
Our diagnostic work noted, let us turn to a deeper consideration of the
results, beginning with the prevailing wisdom encapsulated in the in-
direct claim about an ERA’s effect. As to the first part of the claim, the
findings generally are supportive, but not without their share of nuances.
On the one hand, as we can observe in Table 3 that the coefficient
produced by the ERA variable is positive and significant, which indicates
that the presence of such a formal equality provision does in fact increase
the probability of the adoption of a higher standard of law. So too, as
we can see in Figure 1, that statistical finding is not without substantive
import. What the figure shows is that the probability, over the 30-year
period, of the application of a higher standard of law varies considerably
depending on whether the state adopted an ERA: when we set all other
variables at their mean, the likelihood, on average, of a court invoking
strict scrutiny to adjudicate a sex-based claim is just .11 in the absence
of an ERA. That probability doubles in the presence of an ERA, to .23.
On the other hand, because the figure of .23 is relatively distant from
1.00, it is far from certain that an ERA will lead to the automatic
application of strict scrutiny. The presence of an ERA may raise the
probability of courts taking that step, but it does not—just as some
29. In addition to the concerns we just outlined, we considered three others that might
contaminate the results given our use of observational data. First, there would be endo-
geneity—which could bias our parameter estimates—if standards of law (or case outcomes)
caused states to ratify their ERAs or caused states to be more liberal. But in light of accounts
stressing the critical role played by social movements and state party politics (and ideology)
in the enactment of ERAs, this does not appear to be the case (see, for example, Gammie
1989; Hirczy de Mino 1997; Soule and Olzak 2004). The second possible contaminating
factor is caused by nonrandom selection: it is possible that litigants may shop for venues,
launching litigation only in “friendly” states (that is, those with ERAs). If this were the
case, our estimate of the effect of ERAs would be biased against finding a significant effect.
(If litigants shopped for venues perfectly, they would initiate cases in states with ERAs, so
the presence or absence of an ERA would have no significant effect.) The bias would run
in the wrong direction (toward finding a significant effect) only in the unlikely event that
litigants shop for venues in unfriendly states. Finally, we might be concerned about possible
collinearity if two of the explanatory variables (the ERA and ideology) are tightly coupled,
thereby rendering it impossible to disentangle the independent effects of both. But this is
not the case: the two variables correlate at only .085. Moreover, even if they were correlated
at much higher levels, the model would still supply the right answer, except that the standard
errors would be larger because the model would be less certain as to whether to blame the
ERA or the ideology for the outcome.
Figure 1. Effect of the presence or absence of a state equal rights amendment on standards
of law. The curves represent the probability density of a court invoking strict scrutiny (top),
intermediate scrutiny (middle), or rational basis (bottom) accounting for parameter uncer-
tainty. The dashed curves represent states without an ERA; the solid curves are those with an
ERA. All other variables are held fixed at their sample means. We generated these figures us-
ing a CLARIFY-like simulation (see King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).
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Figure 2. Effect of standard of law on case outcomes. The curves represent the probability
density of a court reaching an outcome favoring the litigant alleging sex discrimination when
it applies the rational basis standard (dashed curve), the intermediate standard (dot-dashed
curve), and the strict scrutiny standard (solid curve), accounting for parameter uncertainty.
We constructed the figure from the simulation outlined in Appendix B. All covariates are held
at their sample means.
scholars have contended and as more general work on judicial decisions
would suggest—ensure it.
If the results pertaining to the first part of the indirect claim are
somewhat mixed, those on the second part are far cleaner and stronger.
The r coefficient in Table 3 indicates that the standard a court uses and
the outcome it reaches are significantly correlated, and the probabilities
displayed in Figure 2 reveal that the relationship is substantively mean-
ingful as well. Notice the monotonic increase in those odds, such that
when courts assess sex classifications via a rational basis test—the lowest
level of scrutiny—the likelihood of finding in favor of the equality claim
is just .20. That probability increases to .47 when courts apply inter-
mediate scrutiny and to .73 when they invoke strict scrutiny. In other
words, and in line with the bulk of the extant literature, under mid-level
scrutiny litigants alleging sex discrimination are nearly as likely to win
as they are to lose, while application of the lowest and highest standards
leads to rather predictable outcomes—although in opposing directions:
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under a rational basis standard, claims of sex discrimination will, on
average, fail, and under strict scrutiny they will, in all likelihood, prevail.
4.2. Features of the Court, the Environment, and the Cases
With the notable exception of those arguing against any effect of an
ERA whatsover, it would hardly be a stretch to read our results as
providing further ammunition to all those engaged in the debate over
the amendment—friends and foes alike—as well as to many of the schol-
ars who have commented on the amendment’s likely impact. But neither
they nor we should ignore the full lessons of our modeling exercise:
namely, the presence (or absence) of a formal constitutional provision
is not the only variable exerting an influence on the choice of standard,
and the use of a high (or low) standard of law is not alone in accounting
for case outcomes.
Turning first to the decision of what standard of law to apply, Table
3 shows that all the incorporated variables play some role in explaining
that choice. The fraction of women on the bench holds particularly
impressive explanatory power. As that fraction increases, as Figure 3
illustrates, the probability of applying a higher standard of law soars,
even after controlling for the presence of an ERA. To see the magnitude
of the effect, consider a court composed exclusively of male justices. On
average, the odds of that court using a rational basis standard, setting
all other variables at their mean, is a hefty .50; the probability of that
same court applying strict scrutiny is but .12. Now consider a court
nearly equally divided between male and female judges: as the figure
illustrates, the probabilities nearly reverse: the odds of this court applying
rational basis are (on average) but .14, while the probability for strict
scrutiny jumps to .47.
This finding lends empirical support to the writings of Sherry (1986)
and others on the existence of a feminine jurisprudence. While women
may not speak in a different voice in all legal areas, nor consistently
vote differently from men, their presence on the bench seems to exert
an influence on how their colleagues structure the adjudication of sex-
based claims. Similarly interesting is the importance of the sex of the
equality-oriented litigant in explaining case outcomes. As we can observe
in Table 3, this variable attains statistical significance, and it too has a
meaningful influence on who ultimately prevails in the suit. If we set all
other variables at their sample mean, the probability of the court finding
discrimination is nearly .50 when a woman brings the suit; it dips to
about a third for all other litigants. In light of the history of ERAs, not
Figure 3. Effect of the proportion of women on the bench on standard of law. The panels
illustrate the predicted probabilities of a court adopting strict scrutiny (top), intermediate
scrutiny (middle), and rational basis (bottom) as the proportion of women on the court in-
creases, accounting for parameter uncertainty. The vertical lines represent 95 percent confi-
dence intervals. All other variables are held fixed at their sample means. We computed these
using a CLARIFY-like simulation (see King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).
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Figure 4. Effect of judicial ideology on case outcome, illustrating the predicted probability
of an outcome favoring the litigant alleging sex discrimination over the range of the Judicial
Ideology variable (from least to most liberal), accounting for parameter uncertainty. The ver-
tical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. All other variables are held fixed at their
sample means. We computed this figure using a CLARIFY-like simulation (see King, Tomz, and
Wittenberg 2000).
to mention the findings of empirically based studies exploring the out-
comes of sex discrimination litigation (see, for example, Gryski, Main,
and Dixon 1986; Mezey 2003), this finding is hardly a surprise; yet it
does present something of a challenge to (largely) normative scholarship
arguing that men have been the largest beneficiaries of equality provi-
sions.
Finally, notice the role played by the political preferences of the
judges—in terms of both accounting for the standard of law applied and
the outcome reached. The variable reaches statistical significance in both
equations (see Table 3): as the judges’ preferences move from right to
left of center, the odds of applying a higher standard and of reaching a
decision in favor of the litigant claiming discrimination increase. Figure
4 substantiates this point with regard to case outcomes: the probability
of an outcome favoring the equality claim jumps from .15 to .74 as
courts move from extreme conservatism to extreme liberalism and when
we hold all other variables at their means.
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Indeed, the effect of ideology (along with the proportion of females
on the court, the sex of the litigant, and so on) is so dramatic that we
might question the relative substantive importance of the two key var-
iables of interest here—the presence or absence of an ERA and the
standard of law. How likely is it, in other words, that courts will apply
the highest legal standard to adjudicate sex discrimination claims in the
absence of an ERA but in the presence of other relevant explanatory
factors?
As it turns out, the effect of an ERA is hard, although not impossible,
to minimize. To see this, consider a court that is extremely liberal (100
on the Berry et al. [1998] measure) and that has the highest proportion
of female judges in our sample (about .50). If that court operates in a
state without an ERA, the probability of it adopting strict scrutiny is
fairly high, .64; in the presence of an ERA, the likelihood increases,
although certainly not precipitously, to .79. Interesting too is that the
.79 probability drops rather dramatically—to well below .64—if either
the proportion of females or the court’s liberalism dips to or below mean
levels. So, for example, even if a court in a state with an ERA is composed
of about half females, the probability of it adopting strict scrutiny drops
to .59 (from .79) should it be composed of ideological moderates (that
is, a court at the ideological mean). The comparable figure for the same
court in a non-ERA state is .40.
What these various scenarios show is that, under the right circum-
stances (say, an extremely liberal court with an unusually high propor-
tion of women), the lack of an ERA will not necessarily stand as a barrier
to the adoption of strict scrutiny. That is why we say it is not impossible
to minimize an ERA’s effect. But it is also why we say it is difficult to
do so: the right circumstances are far from the normal circumstances
(they are instead the extreme and unusual circumstances). And, even
when they do occur, they never generate probabilities of the adoption
of strict scrutiny that are higher than those obtained in states with ERAs.
Under every possible scenario (for example, setting both ideology and
the proportion of women at their means, setting ideology at the lowest
level and women at the highest, and so on), courts in states with an
ERA are more likely to adopt strict scrutiny than those operating in
states lacking the amendment.30
30. These probabilities are available on our Web site.
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5. DISCUSSION: DOES THE U.S. CONSTITUTION NEED AN EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT?
In the title of this article, we ask a straightforward question: does the
U.S. Constitution need an ERA? With our analyses now complete, we
can supply an equally straightforward answer: if we believe that it is
desirable for courts to produce a larger number of equality-oriented
outcomes, then an ERA is neither an impediment nor a constitutional
redundancy. Quite the opposite: while ERAs do not have a direct effect
on judicial decisions, they do, even after controlling for other relevant
factors, increase the probability of a court applying a higher standard
of law to adjudicate claims of sex discrimination. And the application
of a higher standard of law, even after controlling for other relevant
factors, increases the probability of a court reaching a disposition fa-
vorable to litigants alleging a violation of their rights.
At the same time, though, our study suggests that an ERA will not
be the constitutional panacea (or Pandora’s box) some make it out to
be. While the results lend support to arguments suggesting that these
formal constitutional provisions probably will alter the way courts ad-
judicate claims of discrimination, our findings also demonstrate that
other factors—from the fraction of women composing the court to the
position taken by the government over the suit’s resolution to the facts
it entails—likely will impact the efficacy (or lack thereof) of an ERA.
These represent the basic policy implications of our research, but they
are in fact, as our use of “probably” and “likely” indicates, qualified
implications. That is because we have been able to assess systematically
the quality and certainty of our results only with regard to the effect of
ERAs in the states. We cannot—in the absence of an amendment to the
U.S. Constitution and resulting litigation—make a similar assessment
about the federal context. Nonetheless, for reasons we have already
mentioned, we believe that our analyses provide some insights into the
potential effect of a federal ERA—insights that, in general, lend support
to Mansbridge’s (1986) reasoned speculation of some 20 years ago: even
if passage of the ERA leads federal jurists to adopt a strict-scrutiny
approach to sex-based classifications, a step rather likely under our anal-
ysis, that approach will not necessarily compel them to strike down all
classifications as is generally the case in race litigation.31 Rather, and
again as Mansbridge and others (for example, Case 2000; Mezey 2003;
31. As we indicated in note 6, affirmative action litigation is a notable exception.
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Sullivan 2002; Strauss 2001) astutely recognized, the outcomes of sex
discrimination suits will depend, at least in some part, on the types of
judges interpreting the constitutional provision and the particular facts
of the suit itself.
If this is the primary policy implication of our study, then the primary
contribution for more general analyses of legal decisions is clear: just as
so many judicial specialists have suggested, we cannot and should not
count on rules and principles of law to do all the work in explaining
the choices judges make; comprehensive accounts require a consideration
of a range of forces. At the same time, though, we cannot and should
not discount institutions, whether formal or informal in nature. To be
sure, as we emphasized earlier, few students of courts and law think in
this way: at least in theory, most believe that rules play an important
role in adjudication. But theory occasionally turns out to be different
than practice, as exemplified by the many papers—and recent ones at
that—that omit rules from their analyses of court decisions.
Our study suggests that this omission is not optimal. At minimum,
failure to incorporate institutions amounts to underspecification; at
most, it serves to perpetuate a myth about judging common in the social
science literature (and becoming increasingly so in empirical legal schol-
arship): that it is a phenomenon largely about politics and not law. The
lesson of our study, as well as of other contemporary analyses, is that
judging is about both, and only by characterizing it as such are analysts
likely to develop more apt descriptions and richer explanations of how
jurists operate.
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APPENDIX A
Table A1. Description of the Variables (N p 416)
Variable Mean
Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum
State ERA .35 .48 0 1
Court Preferences 44.05 18.88 .96 92.36
ERA Ratification .47 .50 0 1
Female Justices .06 1.00 0 .43
Appellate Court .74 .44 0 1
Standard of Law 1.72 .75 1 3
Physical Difference .23 .42 0 1
Government Participation .63 .48 0 1
Female Litigant .29 .46 0 1
Outcome .41 .49 0 1
APPENDIX B: A BIVARIATE MIXED-RESPONSE PROBIT MODEL
We are interested in modeling two dependent variables that we observe at the
same time. The first variable of interest is called Standard, and the second is
called Outcome. We do not assume that these choices are independent, and thus
do not fit two separate models. Rather, we explicitly model the dependence with
a bivariate mixed-response probit model that allows for correlation across two
equations.
Here is the notation to be used throughout:
indexes the cases;ip 1, . . . , N
p the Standard chosen in each case; this is an ordinal variable that cany1,i
take values ; in our application ;1, 2, . . . , K Kp 3
p a column vector of covariates that explains the Standard chosen onx1,i
the case; it is of dimensionality ;(P # 1)1
p the Outcome reached in each case; this is a dichotomous variable thaty2,i
takes a value of one if the party alleging discrimination won the case and
zero otherwise; and
p a column vector of covariates that explain the Outcome reached inx2,i
the case; it is of dimensionality .(P # 1)2
The model we estimate is essentially an ordinal probit model (McKelvey and
Zavoina 1975) and a dichotomous probit model with correlated errors.32 We
32. This particular application is a special case of a bivariate ordinal probit model.
The model is easily extended to allow for continuous outcomes and any number of equa-
tions. However, if one were to move beyond two dependent variables, inference using the
maximum likelihood method would become essentially impossible. This is the same problem
that plagues estimation of multinomial probit models. Performing Bayesian inference, using
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assume that our observed dependent variables and are governed by latenty y1,i 2,i
(unobserved) utilities in the standard fashion, denoted and , which arez* z*1,i 2,i
modeled by the covariates and .x x1,i 2,i
The first equation is the model for Standard, which is an ordinal variable
taking values . We assume that1, 2, . . . , K
′z* p x b   , (B1)1,i 1,i 1 1,i
where is a column vector of parameters to estimate. The probabilityb (P # 1)1 1
that takes particular values is determined by the distributional assumption,y1,i
the parameters, and a set of cut points . Let t denote the set ofb t , . . . , t1 0 K
all cut points. To identify the model, we set equal to , equal to zero,t t0 1
and equal to . Before imposing the restrictions, there are cut points;t (K 1)K
after identification, there remain to estimate. Given this specification,(K 2)
the marginal probability of observing a particular standard is
′ ′Pr (y p k)p F(t , x b , 1) F(t , x b , 1), (B2)1,i k 1,i 1 k1 1,i 1
where denotes the cumulative distribution of the normal distribution2F(7, m, j )
with location parameter m and scale parameter . The location of the latent2j
utilities with respect to the cut points is what determines the probability of
observing certain outcomes.
The second equation is the model for Outcome, which is a dichotomous
variable. We assume that
′z* p x b   , (B3)2,i 2,i 2 2,i
where is a column vector of parameters to estimate. The marginalb (P # 1)2 2
probability that the party alleging discrimination lost the case is
′Pr (y p 0)p F(0, x b , 1). (B4)2,i 2,i 2
The marginal probability that the party alleging discrimination won the case is
this probability subtracted from one. A positive latent utility corresponds to a
case win; a negative utility corresponds to a case loss.
If we were willing to assume that the Standard and Outcome choices were
independent, we could assume that and were independent and distributed 1,i 2,i
according to a standard normal distribution. This would result in an ordinal
probit model (equation (1)) and a dichotomous probit model (equation (3)),
which could be estimated equation by equation using the maximum likelihood
method and standard software. In this application, however, it makes no sub-
stantive sense to assume that the errors are independent. Indeed, we would expect
Markov chain Monte Carlo methods, would be a promising avenue for estimating higher-
dimensional models.
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some correlation among the errors. We thus assume that the errors follow a
bivariate normal distribution:
 0 1 r1,i p ∼N ,i 2[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] 0 r 12,i
The diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix are normalized to one
to identify the scales on which the latent utilities are measured. The parameter
r is a correlation parameter that gauges the extent to which the errors are
correlated. One could stack equations (1) and (3) to form a seemingly unrelated
regression model in the latent utility space.
To compute the joint probability of observing a particular outcome, one
would need to integrate the bivariate normal distribution over the correct region.
For example,
t 3
Pr (y p 3, y p 1)p f (m , S)dz dz ,1,i 2,i   2 i 2,i 1,i
t 02
where
′x b 1 r1,i 1
m p and Sp ,i [ ][ ]′ r 1x b2,i 2
and f denotes the probability density function of the bivariate normal distri-
bution with mean and variance-covariance matrix S. The probabilities of allm i
other outcomes are computed similarly.
B.1. Estimation
We estimate the model using maximum likelihood. The log-likelihood function
for the model is
lnL(b , b , t, r F y , y )1 2 1,i 2,i
N K
t k
p (y p k) y ln f (m ,S)dz dz (B5) [ ]1,i 2,i   2 i 2,i 1,i{
t 0k1ip1 kp1
t 0k
 (1 y ) ln f (m ,S)dz dz ,[ ]2,i   2 i 2,i 1,i }
t k1
where is an indicator function that takes the value of one if and zero(7) y p k1,i
otherwise. We maximize the log-likelihood function using the Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno algorithm (Nocedal and Wright 1999, pp. 194–201), using the
R (Ihaka and Gentleman 1999) implementation in the optim() function. There
are no known analytical methods for computing the rectangular integrals in the
likelihood function. We use the simulation method of Genz (1992), which is
implemented in the sn library (Azzalini 2002). For problems of modest size
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, the optimizer takes 2–3 hours to converge on a dedicated Linux(N ≈ 450)
workstation. We use the equation-by-equation maximum likelihood estimates
for starting values, which speeds convergence considerably.33 To compute the
White (1980) standard errors, we sum the matrix of scores by the clustering
variable and then use their weighted outer product to compute the variance-
covariance matrix of the estimator.
B.2. Interpretation
To interpret results from the estimate statistical model, we account for parameter
uncertainty by drawing parameter values from their (asymptotic) sampling dis-
tribution (see King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). The predicted probabilities in
Figures 1 and 3 come from equation (2), and those in Figure 4 are from equation
(4). The simulation used to account for parameter uncertainty follows the stan-
dard approach.
The algorithm used in Figure 3 is a bit more complicated, as it requires us
to draw from the conditional distribution . This distribution is a normalf(z*Fz*)2,i 1,i
distribution with mean and variance . To generate′ ′ 2x b  r(z*  x b ) (1 r )2,i 2 1,i 1,i 1
the predicted probabilities, we do the following:
1. Draw a vector of parameters from the (asymptotic) sampling distribution.
For each Standard, draw from a truncated normal distribution with mean ofz*1,i
and variance of one. For , the distribution is truncated above at′x b y p 11,i 1 1,i
zero. For , the distribution is truncated below at zero and above at .y p 2 t1,i 2
For , the distribution is truncated below at .y p 3 t1,i 2
2. Compute the probability of each Outcome using the conditional distri-
bution above.
3. Repeat the simulation a large number of times.
It is interesting to note that these predicted probabilities do not look normally
distributed.
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